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Racial discrimination in Major League
Baseball, can it exist when productivity is
crystal clear?
Will Irwin
Department of Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University
Honors Thesis, Spring 2004
Minority workers in many industries have dealt with wage and hiring discrimination. In
Major League Baseball, it is typically assumed that fair hiring practices are used and that
fair wages are offered due to the intense negotiation process involved with each player
contract. However, past research shows that both wage and hiring discrimination has
been present during some recent time periods. With most industries, racial discrimination
is difficult to measure due to the implicit bias in the productivity variables. However, in
baseball, productivity can be easily measured with offensive and defensive performance
statistics, which are determined completely independent of race. This paper attempts to
use a human capital theory based regression and chi-squared analysis to determine
whether or not racial wage and hiring discrimination is present among outfielders in
Major League Baseball. The key findings are that offensive production and games
played are the determinants of salary, while race is not and that racial hiring
discrimination is not present for the data used.

I. Introduction
Major League Baseball (MLB) players make millions of dollars a year to playa
game. The players come from all over the world to the United States' largest cities to
perform in front of millions of fans each year. From children in the Dominican Republic
playing on gravel fields with broomsticks for bats, socks for balls, and milk jugs for
gloves to children in the wealthy suburbs of southern California, little boys grow up
dreaming of playing for their favorite team. Typically these dreams revolve around
hitting a home run to win the World Series or making a diving catch to save a game, and
for extremely underprivileged children the promise of large contracts to bring their entire

'.
family out of poverty, provide extra inspiration to make it to the big leagues. But are
their dreams tainted by the specter of discrimination?
American labor markets have a long history of racial discrimination. In labor
markets, this discrimination often takes the fonn of pay discrimination and/or hiring
discrimination. Affinnative action programs and equal employment opportunity laws
have been instituted to ensure that minority races are not discriminated against during the
hiring process. However, affinnative action programs and equal employment litigation
are rare to nonexistent in professional sports, and little has been done by the government
to guarantee that minority players receive pay equal to that of their white teammates.
Human capital theory demonstrates that, on average, workers should be paid
according to their likely productivity. However, in many industries, productivity is hard
to measure. Rather than measure productivity directly, researchers use proxies such as
education, previous work experience, and on-the-job training.

Since minorities have

often been discriminated against their entire lives in education and training, it becomes
very difficult to accurately measure discrimination in the work force. All of the proxies
for productivity have implicit racial bias built into them, which blurs the data and makes
any finding on discrimination biased. With baseball, the proxies are a more direct
measure of productivity and do not fall victim to the problems found with using
traditional proxies which are more indirect measures of productivity.
With Major League Baseball, productivity factors that would be included in a
human capital theory based equation might include things such as home runs, runs batted
in, batting average, years of major league experience, and defensive ability. When a
white player hits 50 home runs it should theoretically be treated the same as when a

2

Latino player hits 50 home runs, which makes for variables that have no implicit bias.
Another benefit of using MLB players to assess the state of racial wage discrimination is
that many players, including some of the top players in the league, come from the poorest
areas in Latin America, which shows that professional baseball is an industry with little
class resistance. In many industries, where advanced levels of education are necessary, it
is virtually impossible for a child from a poverty stricken country to attain employment in
that industry. Examples might include doctors, lawyers, accountants, and business
executives. Since MLB, as an industry, does not depend on education, but on athletic
ability, a trait that can develop in even the poorest of circumstances, it does not fall
victim to built in class biases.
By studying racial discrimination in MLB, I hope to show that it does not exist.
Since baseball teams that discriminate would only end up hurting their chances of
winning, it seems that there is a strong incentive to use fair hiring practices and to
provide fair wages. Also, the strong influence of agents on contract negotiations should
insure that all contracts are awarded solely on the basis of performance. I hypothesize
that racial discrimination does not exist in MLB and that race is not a significant
predictor of players' salaries after controlling for productivity. I also hypothesize that
firms do not discriminate against minority players when making hiring decisions.
The following section, Section II, discusses some of the past research about
discrimination in professional sports. Section III presents my theoretical model, and then
Section IV develops my empirical model. Section V shows my variables and the
regression model. Section VI describes my data sources and gives some critique of their
usefulness. Section VII presents my results from the regression equations, and Section
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VIII outlines the results of the chi-square analysis. Finally, Section IX discusses the
conclusions reached from the results and any possible policy implications that may be
needed.

II. Literature Review
In 1957, Gary Becker produced the seminal work for the economic study of

discrimination, The Economics of Discrimination. The theory from his book will be
discussed later in the Theoretical Model section. Many economists have used Becker's
theories to perform empirical studies on various issues of discrimination.
Gwartney and Haworth (1974) examined hiring discrimination for the integration
period ofMLB between 1947 and 1956. They compiled a statistic called "black player
years" for each team and then compared it to games won for the 10 year time span. The
results show that the teams with the five highest number ofblack player years held five of
the six highest spots in the rankings for games won. The New York Yankees was the
only team able to rank in the top six while taking a discriminatory position during
integration.
Medoff(1975) followed the research of Gwartney and Haworth by trying to
discover what level of wage discrimination existed in MLB for the 1968 season. His
model found that racial wage discrimination was not present for his data, but Medoff
recognized that wage discrimination was not the only type of discrimination facing
minority players.
Prior to 1947, an absolute barrier to entry existed for all nonwhite players. An
important research question for the years that followed was whether or not barriers to
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entry into MLB persisted after the color barrier was broken. Medoff recognized that even
though owners might have paid the nonwhite players they have hired fair wages does not
mean that they were hiring as many nonwhite players as deserved to be hired. In order to
test this possibility, he examined whether or not nonwhite career statistics variables were
significantly better than white career statistics. If nonwhites did perform better than
whites, the fact that there were many more white players in the league than nonwhite
would suggest that nonwhite players were not being hired as much as they should have
been. The data were divided between the two leagues since the American League (AL)
had integrated more slowly than the National League (NL). He postulated that the league
with the faster entry rate should have statistically greater productivity for nonwhite
players because the faster entry rate suggests that they have greater access to the better
nonwhite players. The slower entry league would thus have a productivity for nonwhite
players which would be closer to the true mean value, and if this value is not statistically
different from that of the white players in that league, then it can be said that no barriers
to entry exist (Medoff, 1975).
The results showed that the rates of entry were indeed significantly different
showing that the NL did have better access to nonwhite players. The nonwhite players in
the NL were significantly more productive than both the white NL players and the
nonwhite AL players. Furthermore, the AL nonwhites were not significantly more
productive than AL whites. These results show that no barriers to entry existed for
nonwhite players in the AL for this data.
In an article by Bodvarsson and Pettman (2002), entitled "Racial wage
discrimination in major league baseball: do free agency and league size matter?" pitchers
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are used to detennine whether or not racial wage discrimination exists. This study uses a
logarithmic regression model with variables such as race (white or non-white), population
of the player's metropolitan area, productivity variables, and racial make-up of the
player's metropolitan area. Since the study dealt with pitchers, the performance variables
are very different. Examples include: wins, losses, saves, strikeouts, and earned run
average. The study attempts to find out whether or not the addition of more teams to
MLB would eliminate any racial discrimination that existed. The theory was that more
teams would increase the level of competition between teams for good players, thereby
causing teams to offer fair wages to get the best players. The results of this study show
that expansion in 1993 did indeed eliminate discrimination for pitchers.
A study by Fizel, Krautman, and Hadley (2002), "Equity and Arbitration in Major
League Baseball," looks at a theory called "Equity Theory", which states that workers
compare their efforts to their co-workers that are in comparable situations and then adjust
their behavior based on that comparison. They hypothesize that MLB players look to
players of similar abilities to decide how much they should earn when they file for
arbitration and free agency. The study uses both regression and bivariate techniques to
detennine whether or not a player will decide to file for arbitration. The results indicate
that players do look at their co-workers performance and salary when they apply for
arbitration. They do not include a measure of race in their study. If they had, perhaps
they might have found whether minority players make different decisions than white
players on this topic, but by demonstrating that MLB players look at their peers' wages
when negotiating, they suggest a mechanism for how market forces can drive the system
to long run equilibrium where minority players receive equal wages to whites.
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In the context of the current literature, it is extremely important to test for the

presence of wage discrimination amongst MLB outfielders. Since no such research is
currently available, this issue must be analyzed to ensure that minority players are being
treated fairly. Additionally, in order to complete the study, the presence of hiring
discrimination must also be tested for.

III. Theoretical Model

The theoretical basis for this research comes from Gary Becker's work on
discrimination and from Human Capital Theory.
Becker's theory was based on the premise that discrimination was not about
conspiracies against minorities or irrational business practices, but rather that
discrimination arose as a result of the ''tastes'' of individual employers. In the case of
baseball, if a team owner has a taste for discrimination against Latino players, he will
experience a decrease in utility each time he signs a Latino player. This decrease in
utility will be represented in two possible ways: a lower wage for Latino's or fewer
Latino players on the team. The team owner with the taste for discrimination will then
end up paying white players, of equal skill to the Latino, higher wages (Becker, 1971).
Becker's theory indicates that the owners with a taste for discrimination will be
less successful than nondiscriminatory employers. The theory behind this is that in a free
market league, a minority player will receive offers from both discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory owners, and since the discriminatory owners have a negative utility for
signing minority players, the wage they offer will be lower than the nondiscriminatory
owner. Therefore, the nondiscriminatory owner will be able to sign minority players
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more often than the discriminatory owner, giving him a competitive advantage in
building his roster. Also, since Becker's theory suggests that minority wages will be
lower than white wages, nondiscriminatory finns will have lower labor costs. This cost
advantage also gives the nondiscriminatory finn a competitive advantage (Becker, 1971).
In the long run, lower labor costs put nondiscriminatory finns at an advantage
over discriminatory finns. As discriminatory finns decrease in number and
nondiscriminatory finns increase in number, the demand for minority players increases
which causes their wages to increase. This process continues until wages are equal
between white and minority players. Also, in the long run, nondiscriminatory employers
will integrate their finns since white and black wages become equal for each skill level
(Becker, 1971).
According to Becker, employers may also respond to employee and consumer
prejudice in their hiring decisions. If a team owner in MLB is a profit maximizer, as he
should be assumed to be, he will put players on the team that his fans want to watch and
that his employees want to work with. We would expect that minorities would be
underrepresented on those teams where these prejudices exist. If employers respond to
consumer and employee prejudice, there will be lower demand for minority players and
their wages will be lower. Thus, consumer and employee prejudice has the same short
run implication as employer discrimination. In the long run however, Becker argues that
competitive forces should still eliminate the effect of these prejudices just as they
eliminate the effects of employer prejudices. Later in the paper, we look for evidence of
consumer prejudice by exploring whether the distribution ofplayers on teams does not
vary across cities, even though those cities have vastly different racial compositions.
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Becker's theory of employer discrimination indicates that hiring discrimination
results from firms who have a negative utility for hiring minority workers. This negative
utility will cause them to hire minority workers at a lower rate than nondiscriminatory
firms. Therefore, on average, the discriminatory firms should have fewer minority
workers.
Thus, in the short run, Becker's theory predicts the possibility of wage
differentials and racial segregation. The work by Haworth and Gwartney cited above
suggests that this is exactly what was happening in MLB during the 1950's.
However, Becker's theory of discrimination suggests very different outcomes in
the long run. The theory states that both wage differentials and racial segregation should
be eliminated by market forces (Becker, 1971). It has been 57 years since Jackie
Robinson broke the color barrier in 1947, which should be enough time to reach a long
run equilibrium. Thus, we would hypothesize that MLB has reached a long run
equilibrium and that after controlling for differences in human capital between players
there should be no remaining wage differentials or hiring discrimination.
Since it is essential to control for human capital differences between major league
players in order to determine whether racial wage differentials exist, it is important to
have a grasp of human capital theory. Human Capital Theory is used to explain how
productivity factors of a worker's history influence how much they are paid in their jobs.
"Human capital" is seen as the result of investment. People can invest in schooling in
order to increase their level of human capital. Similarly, firms can invest in on-the-job
training for their workers. Since education increases a worker's knowledge and skills
that can be applied to a job, theory suggests that this increase in knowledge will allow the
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worker to be more productive, which will give them the ability to bargain for higher
wages (Rima, 1981). Firms will pay higher wages since the marginal productivity of
their business will be increased with the addition of more human capital to their work
force. Also, since investing in human capital can have costs, such as tuition for schooling
and the opportunity cost of lost wages during the time period of schooling, employers can
be forced to pay higher wages to people with more human capital (Mincer, 1958).
In a traditional work setting, the factors that go into human capital would include
educational attainment level, years of work experience, on-the-job training, and age. All
of these variables theoretically should give an indication of how productive a worker will
be. Once an employer knows how productive the worker will be, he/she can pay them a
wage that is fair for that level of productivity.
For baseball players, the factors that employers look at to determine salary are
very different from the traditional job market. Since players are simply born with innate
abilities, they are compensated for their natural ability to produce in an athletic industry.
However, just as job experience is a form of human capital investment for traditional
industries, the amount of time training and playing high-level professional baseball
should be an important human capital determinant for baseball players. Athletic talent
should be considered more of an amplifier of this training and experience than a form of
human capital for baseball players.
Therefore, a human capital model for baseball will have some different factors,
but the factors in the model will represent productivity in the same way that education,
experience, training, etc. do in a traditional human capital model.
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In conclusion, given Gary Becker's model of discrimination and the human
capital theory of wage determination, I hypothesize:
1) According to Becker's theory of discrimination in the long run, there will be no
statistically significant wage differences between white and minority players after
controlling for productivity differences.
2) According to Becker's theory of discrimination in the long run, there will be no
statistically significant differences in racial distribution among teams.

IV. Empirical Model
Hiring Discrimination
In order to determine whether or not baseball teams discriminate in their hiring
practices, chi-squared analysis will be used to compare the distributions of minority and
majority players across teams.
Wage Discrimination
In order to determine whether there is racial wage discrimination, dummy
variables for race are included in a regression model that also controls for productivity
differences across players.
Equation 1.

Wage = f (productivity, race)
Productivity depends on innate ability and a set of investments in human capital.
In MLB, unlike other industries, productivity can be measured directly by performance
statistics such as runs batted in, home runs, and batting average. Also important in
determining productivity are experience related variables such as games played and age.
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More experienced players may generate more revenue for the club independent of their
productivity because they have loyal fans who are more likely to attend games and
purchase other team sponsored goods.
When studying race as a determinant of wage compensation, it is important to
account for individual differences in productivity due to the factors mentioned above in
order to determine whether or not race has an effect. Since, theoretically, race alone
should not affect a person's productivity, it would be expected that different races would
receive equal pay, ceteris paribus.
In order to determine whether or not MLB players are receiving fair pay, race is
included as one of the determinant variables. Other determinant variables account for
traditional productivity factors. These include measures for offensive and defensive
ability, experience, and reliability of future production.
It is important to note that MLB teams are located in major cities across the

country which range widely in size from New York City, with a metropolitan area of over
20 million people, to Milwaukee, with a metropolitan area just over one million people
(www.Census.gov). Since teams in smaller cities would have to pay just as much as
teams in large cities to attract players, some may say that it is doubtful that a team in a
small market can pay a player equally well as a large market team due to the large
differences in total revenues. However, for the purpose of this study, it is assumed that a
player would not accept a lower salary to play in a small market, and, therefore, that all
salary figures are true values awarded for the level of productivity that is expected of the
player. Given this assumption, no measure of market size is included in the model.
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Conceptually, a players contract value could be thought of depending on several
categories of variables:
Equation 2.

Player Contract Value = f (offensive ability, defensive ability, experience, race)

From this equation, I build a regression equation that I use to test my hypothesis that
racial discrimination does not exist in MLB. This hypothesis combines implications of
Gary Becker's theory of discrimination and ideas from Human Capital Theory. Recall
that Becker's theory suggests that, in the long run, racial wage differences should
disappear as a result of competitive forces in the labor market. Human Capital Theory
suggests that wage differences between players should reflect differences in actual
productivity. Thus, the first research hypothesis is that after controlling for differences in
productivity, race will not be a significant determinant of player contract value. Also,
Becker's theory of discrimination suggests that in the long-run teams should not be
segregated. Thus, the second research hypothesis is that the racial distribution should not
differ significantly across clubs.

V. Variables and Regression Model
The regression model for wage discrimination will take the pieces described in the
theoretical model and apply them specifically to the research problem by using the
available data. The data, which are described in detail in Section VI, consists of 52
outfielders who were eligible for free agency status and signed a new contract between
1997 and 2003.
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The dependent variable is salary. The measure for this variable consists of a one
year contract value, the first year of a new contract. The number of years of the contract
is not included. This is unfortunate because length of contract could be another variable
in which discrimination could playa role. However, data for length of contract are not
readily available.
The regression equation attempts to account for different aspects of a player's
abilities. For the purpose oflimiting the data and eliminating positional biases, only
outfielders are used in the study. Typically, a player is judged by scouts and general
managers on the basis of "five tools": (1) Hitting for average (2) Hitting for power (3)
Ability to steal (4) Ability to catch (5) Ability to throw.

1. Offensive Statistics and Variables
Offensive productivity is typically measured by traditional statistics like batting
average, runs batted in, runs scored, home runs, and steals. The problem with using such
statistics is that they do not fully capture the ability of all players to contribute to their
teams. For example, Player A plays for a team in which the players in front of him and
behind him in the line-up all hit for high average and power, while Player B plays for a
team in which the players immediately surrounding him in the lineup all hit for poor
average and power. If Player A and Player B have exactly the same inherent offensive
capability, but are playing with these different teammates, Player A will have higher runs
scored and runs batted in numbers because there will be more men on base ahead of him
to drive in and better hitters behind him in order to drive him in. Some may say that this
effect will only bias the runs scored and runs batted in measures of performance, but it is
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generally asswned and widely accepted that home runs and batting average can also be
positively and negatively influenced depending on the players surrounding a player in the
line-up. In order to insure that statistical studies ofbaseball hitters are not flawed due to
this "team influence" a statistic has been created by baseball scholar Bill James called
"Runs Created" (www.baseballstuff.com).
The formula for Runs Created has many different variations. It has been changed
many times by its creator and also by other researchers that have used it. For this study,
the most basic formula is used due to the availability of data from www.baseball
reference.com, which has already calculated the Runs Created nwnbers. The formula
used is as follows:

Equation 3.
Runs Created = (Hits + Walks)

* Total Bases / Plate Appearances

"Total bases" is defined as the nwnber of bases reached by a player due to hits, so
for a single: total bases = 1, a double = 2, a triple = 3, and a home run = 4. "Plate
appearances" is the total nwnber of times a player comes to the plate. It differs from "At
bats" because "At bats" subtracts out walks, sacrifices, and hits-by-pitch. "At bats" is the
statistic used to calculate batting average (www.sports-wired.com).
Runs Created is an attempt to estimate a player's total contribution to his team's
total output. It tries to eliminate the "double-counting effect" that occurs when a run is
scored. To explain, each time a run is scored, the player who actually crosses the plate
gets credit for a "run scored", while the player that got the hit to drive the other player in
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gets credit for a "run batted in." Statistically, the run is counted twice. Therefore, the
players on a team that scores 700 runs in a season might have a sum of 1400 runs scored
and runs batted in (minus special cases where runs score without a run batted in being
awarded). In order to try to measure which players on each team are actually most
responsible for the total offensive output, the Runs Created variable gives one player
more credit than the other when each run is scored (www.wfu.edu).This principle is
further illustrated with this hypothetical situation:

Player A hits a triple to lead offan inning. Player B sacrifices Player A home
with a long fly ball to centerfield. In this situation, the statistical breakdown
would be: Player A -1 hit in 1 at batfor a 1.000 batting average and 1 run
scored, Player B - 0 hits in 0 at bats for no change to his batting average and 1
run batted in (sacrifice fly outs do not count as an official at bat).

If these

players 'statistics are compared, Player A would only receive a slight advantage
over Player B in the batting average category. Their run production would be
considered equal.

This example of traditional stat-keeping shows how the player that "did the most" in the
scoring of the run does not earn the credit that he might technically deserve. Runs
Created solves this problem by giving "extra credit" to Player A by giving him 3 total
bases and giving Player B 0 total bases.
For regression analysis, Runs Created appears to be a good alternative to
traditional statistics as a measure of offensive productivity because it eliminates some of

16

•

the team bias that is implicit in the data. Also, by reducing the number of independent
variables in the regression, using Runs Created saves valuable degrees of freedom.
In order to further nonnalize the variable, each players' total Runs Created, for

the years before they sign their contract, is divided by the number of games they have
played and then multiplied by 162 (the number of games in a full season). This should
show their average ability to produce offensively.
The ability to steal is measured, obviously, with a steals statistic. The same
procedure used with Runs Created is also used with steals. Each player's steals value
shows the number of steals they have had on average per 162 game season. On a side
note, this statistic could be extremely interesting due to the fact that some players' main
purpose for being in a line-up is to steal bases. It will be interesting to see ifthese
stealing specialists are rewarded for their rare talent.

2. Defensive Variables
The defensive productivity measures, such as the ability to catch and to throw, are
a little more difficult to quantify. For the ability to catch, the most commonly used
statistic is fielding percentage, but the problem with this statistic is that some slower
players do not have the opportunity to attempt to make difficult plays and therefore end
up having higher fielding percentages than the faster, flashier fielders. This problem is
virtually unavoidable with the data, so fielding percentage will not be included in the
regression.
The ability to throw can be easily quantified with outfield assists. An assist is
awarded to a player when they throw the ball to another player and this action results in
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an out, force or tag. For outfielders, this statistic is extremely important to their overall
defensive ability. For the model, assists are included as a 162-game average, calculated
in the same way as the offensive statistics described above.

3. Experience Variables
In order to account for the traditional Human Capital Theory variable of
experience, the number of games played in the MLB league will be included in the
regression equation. Since many players playa few games in a year before playing their
first full year, it would be impossible to include a variable such as years of experience.
Number of games played will clearly differentiate between young players and veterans,
while also allowing all available statistics prior to contract signing to be used in
calculating potential productivity.
An element of productivity that has nothing to do with the game of baseball but

will still have an impact on the human-capital thought processes that general managers
have when deciding how much money to give to a player is age. Often times, a younger
player will be awarded a large amount of money over a long period of time, while an
older player may receive a one or two year contract worth an extremely large amount of
money. Since no research has been found on how age affects the awarding of salaries in
MLB, it is uncertain what affect age will have in the regression equation. On one hand,
older workers have more experience, even after controlling for games played. Thus,
wages would be directly related to age. On the other hand, reflexes slow and the
probability of injury increases with age. Thus, wages would be expected to be inversely
related to age. Given these opposite effects, the sign on age is indeterminant.
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4. Racial Variables

For this category of variables, dummy variables must be used. For both black and
Latino players, a one or a zero is used to designate a player in either ofthose racial
categories. Being white is the omitted variable. The placement of players into these
categories was completed by judgments based on country of origin, physical appearance,
and surname.
Variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The following equation
will be estimated using OLS:
Player Salary

= aJ + PJ(RC) + P2(ASSIST) + P3( STEALS) + P4( GP) + P5( AGE) +

P6(BLACK) + P7(LATINO)

Table 1: Variables and Descriptions
Description
Dependent
Variable

Salary

Value of Contract

Mean

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

2,440,064.1

7,550,000

250,000

1,985,099.9

78.1

125.6

39.9

20.9

Independent
Variables
(Expected Sign)
RC(+)

(Runs Created / GP)

ASSIST (+)

(Assists / GP)

* 162

9.1

16.7

2.8

3.8

STEALS (+)

(Steals / GP)

* 162

17.3

61.6

1.0

13.7

* 162

GP(+)

Games played before contract
was awarded

523.5

982

168

208.7

AGE (+ or-)

Age on July 1st of the year
contract was awarded

27.9

34

23

2.3

BLACK (0)

1 = Black, 0 = Other

.37

1

0

.486

LATINO (0)

1 = Latino, 0 = Other

.33

1

0

.474
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VI. Data

The sample consists of 52 outfielders who have achieved free agency status and
signed a new contract between 1997 and 2003. Free agency status occurs after a player
has been under contract to a major league team for six years. After those six years, as a
free agent, the player has the option to negotiate with any team he wishes. Thus, free
agent wages are determined purely according to market forces.
The wonderful thing about working with MLB data is that people are fanatical
about keeping track of statistics about every aspect of the game. From offensive statistics
to defensive statistics, to player salaries and free agent filings, all of the data found in this
paper is readily accessible on reputable and reliable websites. It is important to note the
ease of Internet research when working with baseball statistics. Efficiency is drastically
increased due to the extreme quickness by which player data can be found on these
websites. Additionally, definitions of statistics and explanations of how to interpret them
are found easily on the Internet.
The data for offensive and defensive statistics can be found on www.Baseball
Reference.com. This website is basically an encyclopedia ofbaseball players and has
records of almost every player that has ever played in the major leagues.
Data for player salaries can be found at a website run by the chairman of the
Business of Baseball Committee of the Society for American Baseball Research
(www.roadsidephotos.com). The site is particularly useful in determining when the
players had received their salary payments as a result of a free agent signing because it
has a list of all free agent filings made by players. Using this list, the year in which the
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player entered the free agent market can be found and their performance data from the
previous years can be used to determine on what basis their new contract was awarded.
The data for the race variable is less concrete. In many cases the player's country
of origin (www.baseball-reference.com) will indicate into which category they should be
placed. For example, all players from the Dominican Republic are considered to be
Latino. The same can be said for players from any other country in Central and South
America. For minority players born in the United States, the distinction is more difficult
to make. Typically, a determination can be made based on the origin of the player's last
name. A name of Hispanic origin would tend to indicate that the player is Latino.
Conversely, a recognizable "American name" would categorize the player as black. Two
cases where no determination could be made with some certainty are excluded.
The data for the hiring discrimination portion of the study was also found using
www.Baseball-Reference.com.This website lists complete team rosters. From the
rosters, the number of players of each race that a team has employed for a given year can
be determined. The same method as was described before was used to determine the race
of each individual player. For this test, player rosters from the 2000 season were used.
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VII. Regression Results
For independent variables, the unstandardized coefficients, t-statistics, and
significance values are presented below in Table 2.

II Table 2. Coefficients and Significance
(Constant)
RC
ASSIST
STEALS
GP
AGE
BLACK
LATINO
R Z = .545, n = 52

B
-1,319,631
43,127.6
-21,341.3
-520.7
5,447.6
-90,453.0
555,729.0
202,386.1

I

Std. Error I
3,248,449.0
13,601.4
67,442.0
17,834.0
1,324.3
108,941.0
525,330.0
506,230.1

t
-.406
3.171
-.316
-.029
4.114
-.830
1.058
.400

Sig.
.687
.003
.753
.977
.000
.411
.296
.691

The two significant variables are Runs Created and Games Played. The rest are
not significant with extremely low significance values.
Runs Created has a significance value of .003 and, as expected, a positive
coefficient of 43,128, indicating that an additional run created results in 43,128 more
dollars in the value of a player's contract. To put this in perspective, adding a Runs
Created value of 10 for a season would add $430,127 to a player's salary. The average
Runs Created value for the sample is 78.2. Traditionally, a season of 100 runs created is
considered a very good season.
The other significant variable, Games Played, has a positive coefficient of5,448
and a significance value of .000. This variable indicates that an additional year of
experience (162 more games played) should translate, on average, into 882,511 more
dollars. In order to test for possible nonlinearities, a regression was run which included a
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squared transformation of Games Played. Since the results from this regression were
very poor, the squared term was dropped from the regression reported here. Since the
group of players that is used in this group is relatively young their games played numbers
are also relatively low, it is to be expected that more experience will benefit these
younger workers. The highest number of games played in this study is 982, so these
results can only indicate a rate of return on games played up to that point. After that the
return to games played may become negative, reflecting the older age of the player,
which may make a player less desirable.
Steals, Assists, and Age are all not statistically significant variables in this
regression. All of these variables were expected to have positive coefficients, but their
low significance values suggest that the signs on the coefficients are relatively
meaningless. Therefore, the regression results failed to show that steals, defense, and age
are important determinants ofbaseball players' salaries.
Most important for the purpose of this study are the race dummy variables, both
of which are not statistically significant. Since the variables are not significant, the signs
and magnitudes of the coefficients are not important.
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Table 3. Coefficients and Significance

(Constant)
RC
ASSIST
STEALS
GP
AGE
MINORITY
R = .550, n = 52

B
-2,056,674
42,380.2
-15,254.1
1357.7
5,410.3
-63,860.5
365,410.1

Std. Error
3,055,410.1
13,482.2
66,497.9
17,530.4
1,315.7
101,514.7
446,860.1

t

-.673
3.143
-.229
.077
4.112
-.629
.818

Sig.
.504
.003
.820
.939
.000
.532
.296

In order to attempt to further show that race is not a factor in salary determination,
a separate regression was run using a variable, MINORITY, instead of the broken up
racial groups, black and Latino. The results are amazingly similar to the first regression.
In both regressions, the only significant variables are Runs Created and Games Played.

All other variables were not significant in both regressions.
Race, no matter how it is defined, simply does not have an effect on salary for
these data.

VIII. Chi-Squared Results

A chi-squared test was used to test for hiring discrimination by comparing the
proportions of races on the 30 teams in MLB. By comparing the proportions, whether or
not certain teams hire proportionately fewer minorities can be discerned.
The chi-squared analysis comparing the number of players of each race on the 30
MLB teams was not statistically significant. Since the employment distribution across
teams is not statistically different, no hiring discrimination was apparent in the data.
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IX. Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to detennine whether or not racial discrimination
exists in MLB for outfielders. After running the regressions and finding race variables
that were not significant, it can be concluded that under this set of circumstances, racial
wage discrimination does not exist for outfielders in MLB. Also, the chi-squared
analysis did not detect racial hiring discrimination. It appears that MLB has reached the
long run equilibrium that Becker hypothesized where players will be hired and paid
fairly. The positive implications of this are obvious. It is an indication that if
productivity is clear and unbiased in nature, employers will provide fair wages to all
employees and will hire based solely on that productivity. Obviously, very few industries
exist with such clear cut and easily measured productivity, but just the fact that minority
workers are paid fairly when it is, is a positive sign for the state of the American social
consciousness.
It should be noted that we hesitate to generalize this research beyond baseball and

potentially other major professional sports leagues. We fear that by generalizing without
justification, more harm would be done than good by potentially down playing the
importance of testing each industry individually for racial discrimination. Therefore, in
those industries where productivity is easily measured (e.g. NFL, NBA, NHL, handicrafts
industries, and some manufacturing industries) future research should be done to see if
racial discrimination exists after controlling for productivity. However, while
productivity is very easily measured in some industries, most do not exhibit such a large
degree of transparency. It would be a mistake to generalize the results of this study to
those industries.
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Additional future research could examine total contract value, which would
capture the length of contracts to see if baseball owners prefer one race to another for
long tenn contracts. Additionally, researchers could expand the regression to include all
positional players, to try to get a better representation of the entire league's salary
structure.
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